Of planets and the universe: Self-contained regimes in international law

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 483-529

  Simma, Bruno ^a,b,c   Pulkowski, Dirk ^a,b,d  

^a International Court of Justice ^*

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^d YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748358601     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: 14643596     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chl015     Document Type: Article

References (288)

1. The metaphor is attributed to Arnold Wolfers. A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (1962), at 19-24.
2. A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004).
3. S. Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (1995), at xv, 25.
4. M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (2000), at 13.
5. F. Ost and M. van de Kerchove, De la pyramide au réseau? Pour une théorie dialectique du droit (2002), at 14. 'From the crisis in the pyramid model, a competing paradigm - that of law as network - is progressively emerging, although important residues of the former do remain.'
6. Simma, 'Self-Contained Regimes', XVI Netherlands Ybk(1985) 111.
7. Jenks, 'Conflict of Law-Making Treaties', 30 BYbIL (1953) 401, at 405.
8. To name but a few recent book publications, W. H. Wilting, Vertragskonkurrenz im Völkerrecht (199 6)
9. J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003)
10. J. Neumann, Die Koordination des WTO-Rechts mit anderen völkerrechtlichen Ordnungen: Konflikte des materiellen Rechts und Konkurrenzen der Streitbeilegung (2002). Cf. also the International Law Commission's treatment of the notion of lex specialis, M. Koskenniemi, 'Study on the Function and Scope of the lex specialis Rule and the Question of "Self-Contained Regimes"', Preliminary Report by the Chairman of the Study Group submitted for consideration during the 2004 session of the International Law Commission, Doc. ILC(LVI SG/FIL/CRD. 1 and Add. 1, available from the Codification Division of the UN Office of Legal Affairs.
11. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), at 58.
12. In terms of sources doctrine, the lex specialis principle has been categorized either as a general principle of international law, as a rule of customary international law, or as a principle of legal logic. As the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has pointed out, the lex specialis principle was referred to as an example of a general principle in the drafting process of Article 38 of the Statute of the PCIJ, cf. Southern Bluefin Tuna, ITLOS Order of 27 August 1999, para. 123
13. cf. also Neumann, supra note 8, at 86. Scholars who refer to the lex specialis rule as a principle of treaty interpretation tend to consider it as a rule of customary international law, cf. the dissenting opinion of Judge Hsu in the Ambatielos case, ICJ Reports (1952), at 87 et seq.
14. R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (1992), at 1280. Other authors speak of a principle of legal logic, Pauwelyn, supra note 8, at 388.
15. Finally, G. Schwarzenberger has referred to the principle as merely a 'tool in aid of the jus aequum rule', International Law, vol. I, (3rd ed. 1957) 496.
16. Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), ICJ Reports (1960), 6. Arangio-Ruiz, by contrast, suggested that a derogation from the rules on state responsibility should only be permissible by way of 'contractual instruments'
17. G. Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, in ILC Yearbook (1992), Vol. II Part One, 42.
18. H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, libri tres (1653) Liber II, Caput XVI, §XXIX. 'Among those treaties, which, in the above named respects, are equal, the preference is given to such as are more particular, and approach nearer to the point in question. For where particulars are stated, the case is clearer, and requires fewer exceptions than general rules do.' (Trans. A. C. Campbell, 1814, available at http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm).
19. E. de Vattel, Les droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, Reproduction of the original 1758 edition (1916) Liv. II, Ch. XVII, § 316. 'Of two laws or two conventions, we ought (all other circumstances being equal) to prefer the one which is less general, and which approaches nearer to the point in question: Because special matter admits of fewer exceptions than that which is general; it is enjoined with greater precision, and appears to have been more pointedly intended.' (Trans. J. Chitty, 1883, available at http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel.htm).
20. Cf. the dissenting opinion of Judge Hsu in the Ambatielos case, ICJ Reports (1952), at 87 et seq.: 'It is a well recognized principle of interpretation that a specific provision prevails over a general provision.'
21. cf. also Jennings and Watts, supra note 10, at 1280.
22. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports (1997), at para. 132.
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 274. The Court continued to argue, however, that Nicaragua was not required to initiate consultations under a bilateral treaty before seizing the Court since such requirement would be 'wholly artificial' and 'excessively formalistic' in the concrete case.
24. INA Corporation v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Award No. 184-161-1 of 12 Aug. 1985, 75 ILR 1987, para 378.
25. Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points', 23 BYbIL (1957) 203. In the writings of Anglo-Saxon authors, the maxim is predominantly expressed as generalia specialibus non derogant (Jennings and Watts, supra note 10, at 1280
26. Fitzmaurice, ibid., at 236). In substance, both ways of stating the principle refer to the same rule. As Fitzmaurice has pointed out in ibid., the generalia rule 'does not merely involve that general provisions do not derogate from specific ones, but also, or perhaps as an alternative method of statement, thata matter governed by a specific provision, dealing with it as such, is thereby taken out of the scope of a general provision dealing with the category of subject to which that matter belongs, and which therefore might otherwise govern it as part of that category'.
27. K. Engisch, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung (1987, facsimile of the original 1935 edition), at 54
28. 'Niemand kann zugleich eine Handlung bezw. Unterlassung und ihr kontradiktorisches oder konträres Gegenteil prästieren. Deshalb kann auch der Wille eines Befehlenden niemals bewusst darauf gerichtet sein, dass jemand eine Handlung und zugleich ihr Gegenteil vollziehe, daβ zugleich A und non A sei.'
29. Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at para. 28.
30. Cf. supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
31. Koskenniemi, 'Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch', 8 EJIL (1997) 566, at 575-576.
32. Schwarzenberger, supra note 10, at 496.
33. Lowe, 'The Role of Law in International Politics', in M Byers (ed.), The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing? (2000) 216.
34. Ibid., at 220.
35. ILC, supra note 9, at, 359 para 5.
36. S.S. Wimbledon, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 1, at 23.
37. Ibid. at 24.
38. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports (1980), at 38.
39. Ibid., at 40.
40. N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997), at 170, 776, 779. Cf. infra for a discussion of fragmentation from the perspective of Systemtheorie.
41. Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 7.
42. Ibid.
43. Abi-Saab, 'Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks', 31 NYU J Int'l L Pol (1999) 919, at 926.
44. Opinion 1/91, EEA I, 14 Dec. 1991, [1991] ECR, I-6079, at paras 39 and 40.
45. US - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 29 Apr. 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R at 17
46. cf. also: US - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 6 Nov. 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, at 154-157.
47. Cf. Simma, supra note 6, at 117. We thus adopt an autonomous 'international law' definition, which is not identical with Krasner's classical definition of international regimes as 'a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'.
48. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in S. D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983) 2.
49. For a more extensive critique of Riphagen's theoretical approach, cf. Simma, supra note 6, at 115-117.
50. Riphagen, 'Third Report on State Responsibility', in ILC Yearbook (1982), Vol. II, Part One, at 24 para 16
51. cf. also Riphagen, 'State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations', in R. St. J. Macdonald, D. M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (1983) 600.
52. ILC Yearbook (1982), Vol. I, at 201, para. 8.
53. Riphagen, 'Third Report', supra note 39, at 30 para. 54.
54. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 11, at 35.
55. Cf. also ILC Yearbook (1992), Vol. I, at 76.
56. Among them the European Communities, the GATT, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and diplomatic law.
57. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 11, at 40.
58. Cf. also ILC Yearbook (1992), Vol. I, at 77.
59. Ibid., at 41, para. 116: "'External" unilateral measures should thus be resorted to only in extreme cases.... In other words, the principle of proportionality will have to be applied in a very special way - and very strictly - whenever the measures resorted to consist in the suspension or termination of obligations deriving from an allegedly self-contained regime.'
60. ILC, supra note 9, at para. 5.
61. Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 7.
62. P.-M. Dupuy, 'L'unité de l'ordre juridique international', 297 RdC (2002) 1
63. Similarly, K. Zemanek, 'The Legal Foundations of the International System', 266 RdC (1997) 62: 'The 'unity' of international law in the sense of its homogeneity is therefore a construct.'
64. Cf. also the discussion in Section 2D of this article.
65. M. Delmas-Marty, Global Law: A Triple Challenge (2003), at 74. For better readability, we have chosen to quote the English translation. Yet, the connotations of the original text are somewhat different: '[l]e droit a l'horreur du multiple. Sa vocation c'est l'ordre unifié et hierarchisé, unifié parce que hierarchisé. Et l'image qui vient à l'esprit des juristes, c'est la pyramide des normes, construite pour l'éternité, plutôt que celle des nuages, fussent-ils ordonnées.'
66. M. Delmas-Marty, Trois défis pour un droit mondial (1998), at 104.
67. For a general discussion of positivist approaches to the notion of a legal system, cf. J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (2nd ed., 1980).
68. Delmas-Marty, supra note 50.
69. According to H.L. A. Hart, the existence of such secondary rules, 'rules of recognition' and 'rules of change and adjudication', is a necessary precondition for the existence of a legal system. H. L. A. Hart, Concept of Law (1961), at 113. While reference to Hart's seminal book is common, one should nonetheless keep in mind that international legal scholarship has adopted a somewhat different definition of secondary rules.
70. Paulus, 'Commentary to Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner: The Legitimacy of International Law and the Role of the State', 25 Mich J Int'l L (2004) 1047, at 1050.
71. H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (1970), at 33 and 320: 'a coercive order'.
72. Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 22.
73. Delmas-Marty, supra note 50.
74. Combacau, 'Le droit international: Bric-à-brac ou système?', 31 Archives de philosophie du droit (1986) 85, at 88. 'This is not the case in international law, in which the principle of the sovereign equality of States excludes all forms of hierarchical differentiation of norms, as they are all ultimately founded upon an act of will, at least supposed, of States that are all on a par with each other (equality) and that recognize no common superior (sovereignty).'
75. Cf. Paulus, 'Jus cogens Between Hegemony and Fragmentation: An Attempt at a Re-appraisal', 74 Nordic J Int'l L (2005) 297, at 298.
76. Ibid., at 330.
77. Al-Adsani v. UK, Application No. 35763/97 [2001] ECHR 761 (21 November 2001).
78. J. Combacau, note 57.
79. A. Paulus, note 58, at 331.
80. K. Engisch, note 19, at 1: 'Die Dogmatik ist die Einheit der Rechtsordnung! In der Tat: Wenn irgend etwas der dogmatischen Wissenschaft vom Recht Antrieb zur Erhebung über bloβes nicht' dogmatisches' auch dem Laien mögliches Aufgreifen und Deuten einzelner Rechtsvorschriften zu geben vermag, wenn irgend etwas der Rechtsdogmatik den von ihr begehrten Rang einer echten Wissenschaft - wir dürfen sogar noch anspruchsvoller sagen: Den Rang der Wertungswissenschaft par excellence - zu sichern geeignet ist, so ist es die beherrschende Bedeutung des Prinzips der Einheit der Rechtsordnung...'
81. Ibid., at 3. 'Man mag sogar davon sprechen, dass die Einheit der Rechtsordnung nichts weiter als eine regulative Idee oder das Produkt ganz bestimmter juristischer Methoden sei.'
82. C.-W. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz (1969), at 21: 'In der Tat ist der Versuch, das System einer bestimmten Rechtsordnung als formal-logisches oder axiomatisch-deduktives zu konzipieren, von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Denn die innere Sinneinheit des Rechts, die es im System zu erfassen gilt, ist entsprechend ihrer Ableitung aus dem Gerechtigkeitsgedanken nicht logischer, sondern wertungsmäßiger, also axiodologischer Art.'
83. Ibid., at 16: '... deshalb bildet das aus dem Gleichheitssatz folgende Gebot wertungsmäßiger Folgerichtigkeit den ersten entscheidenden Ansatz für die Verwendung des Systemgedankens in der Jurisprudenz...'
84. Ibid., at 46: 'ist indessen [... die] wesentliche Frage noch nicht beantwortet: Die nach den tragenden Elementen, in denen die innere Einheit und Folgerichtigkeit der Rechtsordnung sichtbar wird.'
85. Ibid.
86. P. Heck, Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz (1932), at 107.
87. Cf. Simma, 'Fragmentation in a Positive Light', 25 Mich JIL (2004) 845.
88. On this cf. Bederman, 'Globalism and International Law: Values and Choices', Halle Institute Occasional Paper (2001).
89. On the undiminished significance of the notion of sovereignty, even and particularly in a globalizing world, cf. Nolte, 'Sovereignty as Responsibility', 99 ASIL Proceedings (2005) 389
90. Nolte, 'Zum Wandel des Souveränitätsbegriffs', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 Apr. 2004, at 8;
91. Kingsbury, 'Sovereignty and Inequality', 9 EJIL (1998) 599.
92. CanariS differentiates between Systembrüche (frictions in the system) and systemfremde Normen (norms alien to the system), supra note 65, at 112 and 131.
93. Similarly, MacCormick, 'Beyond the Sovereign State', 56 Modern LR (1993) 1, at 10. For Kennedy's characterization of elements of styles of legal argumen,
94. see Kennedy, 'Theses about International Law Discourse', 23 GYIL (1980) 354.
95. Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at para. 27.
96. See the similar definition of a system in a weak sense in M. van Hoecke, Law as Communication (2002), at 109-110: 'System in the weak sense only requires some structure, some relationship among the elements of the system, which makes it possible to identify it as something that exists on its own and can be distinguished from a number of unordered elements and from other systems.' (emphasis in original).
97. According to Dominicé, international law is a system, because actors (states as well as non-state actors) behave accordingly: 'This conclusion is buttressed by the finding that there is a sort of collective opinio juris, a conviction that international law exists and that states could not do without it. There is no need to seek a theoretical foundation to justify this assertion, which results from a mere observation of reality and is expressed by the maxim ubi societas ibi ius.' Dominicé, 'Methodology of International Law', in R. Bernhardt et al., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. III (1997).
98. Combacau's answer is equally grounded on the empirical reality of international law: 'Tout se passe comme si les Etats admettaient que ce qui, structurellement, se présente comme une norme, c'est-à-dire ce qui peut se formuler verbalement en termes de devoir-être, êtait en effet obligatoire, par application d'une exigence-je ne dis pas 'd'une norme'- supérieure à celle qu'énonce la norme en question.'
99. Combacau, supra note 57, at 90. 'Everything happens as if States assume that that which, structurally, presents itself as a norm (that is, capable of verbal formulation in terms of an ought) is in effect obligatory, through the application of a requirement - I won't say "of a norm" - superior to that which the norm in question expresses.'
100. James Crawford has examined what makes international law an open system. While he proves his case as far as the openness of international law is concerned, its systemic character is more assumed than explained. According to Crawford, it suffices to regard 'international law in the modern period as providing a formal structure, based on sovereignty, negotiation and consensus, on which we are building in a variety of ways.' J. Crawford, International Law as an Open System (2002) 17, at 28.
101. Zemanek, supra note 49, at 61-65.
102. Hafner notes that international law lacks comprehensive organization. Such shortcomings, however, do not preclude that international law can at least be described as an 'unorganized system'. Hafner, 'Risks Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International Law', in International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Annex, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/55/10) 321.
103. A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? (1986), at 1 (emphasis added).
104. Carty, 'Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law', 2 EJIL (1991) 1, at 25.
105. There is surprisingly little in-depth discussion as to how the notion of general international law came about. For a classical discussion of the concept, cf. P. Reuter, 'Principes de droit international public', 103 RdC (1961) 469. Reuter rightly distinguishes between two functions of the notion of 'généralité: On the one hand, the 'fonction du nombre abstrait d'Etats liés par une norme', on the other hand, 'le degré d'abstraction d'une norme' (ibid.). 'A function of the abstract number of States bound by a norm' ... 'the degree of abstraction of a norm' Typically, textbook discussions of the concept of general international law fail to take account of the multiple aspects of generality. Reuter concludes that 'pour la mise en ordre des normes internationales la généralité ne donne que des indications diverses qui doivent être composées avec d'autres considérations.' Ibid. 'the notion of generality only provides us with differing indications as to how international norms should be ordered, which must be combined with other considerations.' It is hardly disputed that the rules on state responsibility form part of the body of rules denoted as general international law. Since these rules can be very specific in content, their 'generality' appears to be a function of their universal application and their fundamental character, to take up Reuter's distinction.
106. Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz had maintained that no derogation was allowed 'from those essential rules and principles on the consequences of internationally wrongful acts that are inherent to international relations and international law' (Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 11, at 40, para. 112.). However, state practice does not unequivocally indicate the recognition of a jus cogens character of the rules on state responsibility. In most cases, the International Court's statement in North Sea Continental Shelf appears to also hold true with regard to secondary norms of general international law: '[I]t is well understood that, in practice, rules of international law can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular cases or as between particular parties.' (North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports (1969), at 42 para. 72).
107. Elettronica Sicula (ELSI), ICJ Reports (1989), at 42, para. 50.
108. J. Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507 (2000) para. 147.
109. Pauwelyn, supra note 8, at 213.
110. ILC Yearbook, Vol. 1 (1982), at 202, para. 16.
111. 35 ILM (1996), at 32, para. 11.
112. Krasner, supra note 37.
113. Cf. for example, Winham, 'International Regime Conflict in Trade and Environment: The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO', 2 WTR (2003) 131.
114. Cassese, 'Remarks on Scelle's Theory of 'Role Splitting' (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law', 2 EJIL (1990) 210.
115. Cf. G. Scelle, Manuel de droit international public (1948) 19-21.
116. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, 'Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law', 25 Mich J Int'l L (2004) 999. The authors' analysis touches on numerous interesting issues. In the following, however, we will limit our summary of the article to what appears to be of particular relevance for our case study on self-contained regimes.
117. Ibid., at 1003.
118. Ibid., at 1017.
119. Ibid., at 1004. This proposition, while plausible at first glance, is not beyond contestation. The somewhat radical title chosen by the authors for their article in the Michigan Journal, 'The Vain Search for Legal Unity', risks misguiding the reader. For the authors do concede that' [u]nity of the legal system has been achieved at global level' (ibid., at 1008). In reality, they do not dispute the notion of some kind of 'legal unity', but rather the possibility of a quasi-constitutional global law, integrating in an orderly manner the most diverse values and rationalities. It is the 'multitude of internal contradictions' (ibid.) within unity that the authors highlight in their piece. A fundamental point of critique of Fischer-Lescano and Teubner's approach concerns their apparent equation of differentiation of issue regimes with the fragmentation of international law. Despite the complexity of the authors' theoretical framework, their analysis does not pay due account to another important systemic distinction drawn by systems theory: The distinction between the legal system and its environment (constituted by other systems such as politics, religion or economics). It is precisely systems theorists who have emphasized that the legal system achieves a particular inner cohesiveness by virtue of its binary operations, which autopoietically refer back to the system's previous operations. Hence, it does not suffice, for example, to point out that a 'rationality conflict' between trade concerns and biosafety can be described as a collision of the issue systems of commerce and health (each of which comes with a particular institutional and legal arrangement). At the same time, the legal system (comprising lawyers within both institutions for trade facilitation and health protection) remains operatively closed vis-à-vis its political and economic environment. In an attempt to maximize its own rationality, the legal system attempts to resolve conflicts within its own operation, at the expense of, say, the political system. Trade lawyers and health lawyers simultaneously act as elements of two systems: As part of the legal system (which is eager to distinguish itself from its non-law environment); and as part of the subject-matter systems 'trade' or 'health' (which aim at maximizing their respective rationality at the expense of other rationalities prevalent in the environment). In our view, the crux of the fragmentation of international law lies precisely in this inner tension, the 'role strain' that international lawyers are exposed to. Mark Van Hoecke, who himself strongly draws on systems theory, consequently arrives at a different conclusion: The more radically a society's issue systems diversify, the stronger are in turn the forces towards autonomy of and unity within the legal system. According to Van Hoecke, '[a] stronger 'juridification' of our societies has led to an increased autonomy of law, but at the price of an increased interdependence of legal systems.'
120. (M. Van Hoecke, 'Legal Orders Between Autonomy and Intertwinement', in K.-H. Ladeur (ed.), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (2004) 177, at 193.
121. Cf. also ibid. at 186: 'Here, one could also state that the decrease of autonomy vis-à-vis other legal systems increases the autonomy towards the non-legal systems.' Given the increase in 'intersystemic interdepence of legal systems' (ibid., at 194), a stronger role of legal doctrine is called for, which achieves a 'rational structuring of all those data into one coherent whole.' (Id.) In short: 'Increasing fragmentation of law is thus coupled with an enhanced intertwinement of the different areas of law.' (Id. at 187). Cf. for other points of critique - in particular concerning a lack of legitimacy of decentralized law-making by nonstate actors - Paulus, supra note 54.
122. Ibid., at 1008.
123. For a balanced discussion of the move from 'territoriality' to 'functionality', cf. Paulus, 'From Territoriality to Functionality? Towards a Legal Methodology of Globalization', in I. F. Dekker and W. G. Werner (eds), Governance and International Legal Theory (2004) 59.
124. For this term, cf. Alvarez and Leebron, 'Linkages', 96 AJIL (2002) 5, at 6.
125. Ibid., at 1013.
126. It should be noted, however, that Fischer-Lescano and Teubner adopt a rather broad and somewhat vague definition of self-contained regimes (borrowed from Koskenniemi, supra note 8, Addendum para. 105.
127. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 93, at 1013.
128. The authors refer to other factors, quoting a definition proposed by Walker, 'The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key', in G. de Bürca and J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (2001) 31, at 33.
129. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 93, at 1015. Such regimes are characterized by the fact that they establish a structural coupling between their primary and secondary rule-making with the creation of substantive social norms in a specific societal sector
130. ibid., at 1016.
131. Ibid., at 1018 et seq. For a similar conclusion
132. cf. K.-H. Ladeur, Postmoderne Rechtstheorie: Selbstreferenz - Selbstorganisation - Prozeduralisierung (1992) 159 et seq. (particularly at 161).
133. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 93, at 1022.
134. Ibid.
135. Luhmann, supra note 31, at 776 and 779.
136. Cf. in the context of WTO law, McRae, 'The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?', JIEL (2000) 27.
137. Similarly, Dunoff, 'The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence', 33 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev (2001) 979, at 1009.
138. Costa v. ENEL, 6/64, [1964] ECR, 585 at 593.
139. Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR, I-5357.
140. D. V. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals (1975), at 141 et seq.
141. G. Arangio-Ruiz, 'Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-fourth Session', ILC Yearbook Vol. I (1992) 76.
142. Singer, 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations', in K. Knorr and S. Verba, The International System: Theoretical Essays (1960) 77. Singer's article constitutes the classical articulation of the level-of-analysis problem. Contemporary international relations theory routinely analyses international relations at various theoretical levels.
143. Ibid., at 80.
144. Ibid., at 83.
145. Articles 4-11 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 9.
146. Articles 20-27 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ibid.
147. Article 32 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ibid.
148. de Vattel, supra note 13. 'it is enjoined with greater precision, and appears to have been more pointedly intended'.
149. Kelsen, supra note 55, at 320: 'international law is "law", if it is a coercive order, that is to say, a set of norms regulating human behaviour by attaching certain coercive acts (sanctions) as consequences to certain facts, as delicts, determined by this order as conditions, and if, therefore, it can be described in sentences which - in contradistinction to legal norms - may be called "rules of law".'
150. Ibid. at 321: 'It is easy to demonstrate that this assumption is correct with respect to reprisals. For it is a principle of general international law that a state which considers some of its interests violated by another state, is authorized to resort to reprisals against the state responsible for the violation. A "reprisal" is an interference under normal circumstances forbidden by international law - in the sphere of interest of a state; it is an interference that takes place without and against the will of the state concerned and is in this sense a coercive act, even if it is executed without physical force (i.e., without force of arms) when the affected state does not resist.'
151. In fact, we would tend to side with Rosalyn Higgins, who stated that the existence of effective sanctions does not predicate the existence of a norm of international law. R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), at 16. This is particularly true in light of contemporary compliance theories, which have suggested that coercion is merely one out of several factors that encourages compliance with international obligations
152. cf. Pulkowski, 'Testing Compliance Theories: Towards the United States Obedience of International Law in the Avena Case', 19 Leiden J Int'l L (2006), issue 2.
153. Despite its frequent use, the systematic foundation and the actual content of the principle of effective interpretation have remained somewhat opaque. Taking the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a starting point, the effectiveness principle (or the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat) is reflected either in the duty to interpret 'in the light of [a treaty's] object and purpose' or in the notion of good faith. The notion of good faith may be the more convincing solution: The principle of effective interpretation precludes a state from frustrating the obligations assumed by invoking a formal circumvention of the conditions under which the norm would apply. Cf. I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd ed. 1984), at 115 et seq.
154. R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed. 1992), at 1280 et seq.
155. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 111, at 77.
156. Cf. Simma, supra note 6, at 111
157. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 11, at para. 115
158. Reisman, 'The Enforcement of International Judgments', 63 AJIL (1969) 1, at 7 (footnote omitted).
159. Ibid.
160. US - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 17.
161. Cf. generally, Pauwelyn, 'The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?', 95 AJIL (2001) 535.
162. As R. Howse has pointed out, reference to the general international law on treaty interpretation may, in addition, be seen as enhancing the legitimacy of the WTO: '[T]he very decision to follow these general interpretative rules of public international law enhances the legitimacy of the dispute settlement organs in adjudicating competing values, because these norms are common to international law generally, including to regimes that give priority to different values, and are not specific to a regime that has traditionally privileged a single value, that of free trade.' Howse, 'From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trade Regime', 96 AJIL (2002) 94, at 110.
163. US -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, WT/DS58/AB/R.
164. The panel briefly discussed the various international instruments presented by the US. However, it was not convinced that such instruments would distract from the parties' substantive WTO obligations. The Appellate Body, by contrast, deferred to rules and standards outside the WTO regime to some extent, interpreting the terms of WTO provisions in accordance with such rules and standards.
165. Ibid., para. 187.
166. The US' first submission is available at http://www.ustr.gov/ Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/ Dispute_Settlement_Index_-_Pending.html.
167. The EC's first submission is available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/ wtodispute/search.cfm?code=2.
168. Riphagen, 'Fourth Report', in ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part One, (1983), at 17, para. 89.
169. Ireland vs. UK, ECLHR, Ser. A Vol. 2 5, para. 239. Cf. similarly the statement by the European Commission of Human Rights in the Pfunders case: 'It clearly appears from these pronouncements that the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national interests but to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed in its Statute, and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law.' 4 Yearbook of the European Convention of Human Rights (1961) 116, at 138.
170. Common positions of 7 May and 29 June 1998, OJ 1998, L 143 and L 190; implemented through EC Regulations 1295/98 (L 178, 33) and 1901/98 (L 248, 1).
171. Rousseau, 'Chroniques des faits internationaux'- Subsection on 'Mesures adoptées par les Etats occidentaux a l'égard de la Pologne', 86 RGDIP (1982) 605.
172. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports (1980) 40.
173. Concurring: Zemanek, 'The Unilateral Enforcement of International Obligations', 47 ZaöRV (1987) 40: 'The Court wanted to protect diplomats from reprisals, not their sending States.'
174. Cf. the Commentary to the ILC Draft Article 44 of 1958 (now Article 47 of the Vienna Convention), ILC Yearbook, Vol. II (1958), 105, which presupposes the existence of reprisals in diplomatic law: 'It is assumed that the restrictive application in the sending State concerned is in keeping with the strict terms of the rule in question, and within the limits allowed by the rule. Otherwise there is an infringement of the rule and the action of the receiving State becomes an act of reprisal.'
175. The ILC's 2001 Commentaries on State Responsibility appear to envision a more far-reaching protection of diplomatic immunities. '[M]easures may be taken affecting diplomatic or consular privileges, not prejudicing the inviolability of diplomatic or consular personnel or of premises, archives and documents.... On the other hand, the scope of prohibited countermeasures under article 50 (2) (b) is limited to those obligations which are designed to guarantee the physical safety and inviolability (including the jurisdictional immunity) of diplomatic agents, premises, archives and documents in all circumstances, including armed conflict.' ILC, supra note 11, at 339. Even Barnhoorn, otherwise a supporter of the self-containment theory, admits that 'the exact determination of the scope of the [inviolability] rule has always given problems.... [I]t is not entirely clear what immunities are precisely covered.'
176. Barnhoorn, 'Diplomatic Law and Unilateral Remedies', XXV Netherlands Yearbook IL (1994) 39, at 80.
177. Reuter, Summary Records of the Meetings of the Thirty-sixth Session, ILC Yearbook, Vol. I (1984), at 264.
178. Which formed the negotiating basis of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
179. ILC Yearbook, Vol. II (1958), at 97.
180. Barnhoorn, supra note 141, at 63.
181. ILC, supra note 9, at 240.
182. Dominicé, Représailles et droit diplomatique', in Recht als Prozeß und Gefüge. Festschrift für Hans Huber zum 80. Geburtstag (1981) 551. 'It is not necessary to have recourse to the notion of a self-contained regime in order to affirm that an initial violation of diplomatic law cannot in any way authorize the wronged State to transgress that law in turn.'
183. ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part 1 (1983), at 18, para. 97.
184. Riphagen's report, however, offers an unfortunate example of a misleading use of terminology, using 'selfcontained regimes' as a synonym for any subsystem,
185. cf. supra fn 88 and accompanying text.
186. ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part 1 (1992), at 39, para. 110.
187. Article 14 as proposed in 1995, International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Forty-seventh Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/50/10) 149.
188. International Law Commission, Draft Commentaries to Articles 13 and 14 of Part Two of the Draft Articles, A/CNA/L.521, with further references.
189. International Law Commission, supra note 26, at 339: 'The justification in each case concerns not so much the substantive character of the obligation but its function in relation to the resolution of the dispute between the parties which has given rise to the threat or use of countermeasures.'
190. Ibid., at 341.
191. There is some indication that the ILC considered the admissibility of targeting diplomatic personnel by countermeasures to be a question of proportionality because the Commission notes that, after the remedies provided under the Vienna Convention have been exhausted without success, '[a]t a second level, measures may be taken affecting diplomatic or consular privileges, not prejudicing the inviolability of diplomatic or consular personnel or of premises, archives and documents. Such measures may be lawful as countermeasures if the requirements of this chapter are met.' Ibid., at 339. We go only one step further in the sense that even the inviolability of diplomatic personnel should not be sacrosanct provided that sufficiently grave state interests are at stake.
192. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 274.
193. Costa v. ENEL, 6/64, ECR [1964], 585 at 593.
194. Van Gend en Loos, 26/62, ECR [1963], 1 at 12.
195. Commission v. Luxemburg and Belgium, joint cases 90/63 and 91/63, ECR [1964], 625.
196. Mutton and Lamb, 232/78, ECR [1979], 2729.
197. Cf. Pellet, 'Les fondements juridiques internationaux du droit communautaire', V Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (1994) 249
198. A. Marschik, Subsysteme im Völkerrecht (1997) 210
199. Conway, 'Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States', 13 EJIL (2002) 679.
200. Hartley, 'International Law and the Law of the European Union- A Reassessment, 72 BYbIL (2001) 1.
201. De Witte, 'Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European Community?', XXV Netherlands Yearbook IL (1994) 299, at 331.
202. Cf. also the analysis by Hartley, supra note 161, who concludes that the EC has not constituted its separate legal system by virtue of some kind of constitutional metamorphosis subsequent to the EC's foundation in the realm of international law.
203. Conway, 'Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States', 13 EJIL (2002) 679, at 688.
204. Cf. Simma, supra note 6, at 126 et seq.
205. Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, ECR [1991], I-5357.
206. Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Germany and Factortame v. UK, joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, ECR [1996], I-1029.
207. If the Commission fails to do so, the 'injured' state could consider action against the Commission pursuant to Article 232.
208. Cf. Schwarze, 'Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Beziehungen', 18 Europarecht (1983) 24. The UK government initially requested that the Commission order France to pay £20 million in damages. The request, however, was withdrawn for political reasons.
209. A. G. Toth, Legal Protection of Individuals in the European Communities, Vol. II (1978), at 181;
210. cf. for further references, A. Marschik, Subsysteme im Völkerrecht (1997) 231 et seq.
211. Tomuschat, 'Völkerrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche vor dem EuGH', in J. F. Baur, P. Müller-Graff and M. Zuleeg (eds), Europarecht - Energierecht - Wirtschaftsrecht: Festschrift für Bodo Börner zurn 70. Geburtstag (1992) 458.
212. Marschik, supra note 161, at 233, who points out that the Court in Commisson v. Italy, 39/72, ECR [1973], 112 explicitly mentioned that one Member State may be liable towards another Member State.
213. J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: The Transformation of Europe (1999) 29.
214. As Conway points out, Article 292 EC Treaty only excludes other judicial or institutional methods of dispute resolution; it is not concerned with the question of unilateral enforcement. Conway, supra note 161, at 686.
215. Weller, supra note 173, at 29.
216. Concurring: Conway, supra note 161, at 691 and
217. Marschik, supra note 161, at 173, 259 et seq.
218. Kuyper, 'The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law', XXV Netherlands Yearbook IL (1994) 227, at 252.
219. Weller, 'The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement', 35 JWT (2001) 191, at 197.
220. Before the creation of the WTO, there was severe disagreement between the US and the EC, however, on whether unilateral action was precluded. The EC took the view that the GATT was essentially a political arrangement rather than a legal one and that the positive consensus system was an integral part of the GATT. Cf. M. Hahn, Die einseitige Aussetzung von GATT-Verpflichtungen als Repressalie (1995).
221. ILC, supra note 11, at 357.
222. M. Garcia-Rubio, Unilateral Measurs as a Means of Enforcement of WTO Recommendations and Decisions (2001).
223. Cf. also Mavroidis, 'Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place', 11 EJIL (2000) 763.
224. Articles 29 and 30 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 9.
225. 'Recommend' in the DSU's language. The recommendation formally assumes a binding character once it is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body.
226. Articles 31 et seq. of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 9.
227. Articles 49 et seq. of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ibid.
228. Cf. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
229. Simma and Tams, 'Commentary on Article 60', in O. Corten and P. Klein (eds), Commentaire article par article des Conventions de Vienne de 1969 et 1986 sur le droit des traités (forthcoming).
230. This agreement to compensation has thus been described as 'a temporary renegotiation of the WTO treaty', Pauwelyn, supra note 8, at 219.
231. However, it could be argued that the option of cross-retaliation, which allows a member under certain conditions to suspend the performance of other covered Agreements, introduces an element of reprisals.
232. Fitzmaurice, supra note 18, at 203.
233. Cf. Sicilianos, 'The Relationship between Reprisals and Denunciation or Suspension of a Treaty', 4 EJIL (1993) 341
234. J. Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/498 Add 2 (1999) paras 314-329.
235. Crawford and Olleson, 'The Exception of Non-Performance: Links between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility', 21 Australian Yearbook IL (2000) 1.
236. Pauwelyn, supra note 8, at 230.
237. Cf. http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/031124173342.qe9cs5uw.
238. United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 10 November 2003, WT/DS248/ AB/R.
239. United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, 22 December 1999, WT/DS152/R, 7.46.
240. ILC, supra note 9, at 357;
241. cf. also ibid., at 330.
242. Critical also Pauwelyn, supra note 8, at 233. Para. 73.
243. In favour or reparation, e.g., Ecuador, WT/DSB/M/89, para. 8. Against reparation Australia, the EC, the US and Canada, WT/DSB/M/75, 5 et seq.
244. In favour: Mavroidis, supra note 181, at 765
245. Pauwelyn, supra note 8, at 226.
246. Against: Crawford, supra note 87, at para. 420.
247. Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Panel Report, 21 January 2000, WT/DS126/RW, 6.48. Even in subsidies cases it is dubious whether restitutio is always a feasible option. In the Foreign Sales Corporations case, e.g., the US would potentially be under an obligation to demand thousands of recipients of FSC tax credits to pay unjustly credited taxes for a period of two decades. Such an obligation would almost certainly conflict with the prohibition of retroactive legislation of most states' constitutions.
248. Guatemala - Cement II, Panel Report, 17 November 2000, WT/DS156.
249. Since it is 'materially impossible' or involves 'a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation', Article 35(b) of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 9.
250. Petersmann, 'GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Anti-Dumping Law', 8 CMLR (1991) 101
251. Marschik, 'Too Much Order? The Impact of Special Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy of the International Legal System', 9 EJIL (1998) 212 at 226.
252. Kuyper, supra note 177, at 252.
253. Cf. also Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights', 13 EJIL (2002) 753 at 766 et seq.
254. Perez has suggested that countermeasures may, furthermore, be necessary if a state relies in an abusive manner on the 'self-judging security exception' of Article XXI GATT (Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security', 23 Yale J Int'l L (1998) 310, at 324). In our view, however, the security exception should be subject to limited panel review. Applying a good faith test, which would require that the measure taken must appear at least somewhat reasonable and understandable from an objective point of view, seems the most balanced and practical option.
255. It takes account of states' interests to avoid presenting a detailed case on what is a national security matter, while maintaining a certain level of transparency and accountability (cf. the overview in Pulkowski, 'Coalition Procurement for Iraq in the Crosshairs of WTO Law' 5 German LJ (2004) 257, at 279).
256. This approach was essentially developed by Schloeman and Ohlhotf, ''Constitutionalization' and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence', 93 AJIL (1999) 424, at 444. Consequently, there is no remedial law deficit as diagnosed by Perez.
257. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports (1986), 134.
258. Ibid.
259. The distinction between responsibility and its invocation underlies the ILC's Articles. According to Article 1, every internationally wrongful act of a state entails that state's responsibility. Article 2 defines as a wrongful act any conduct that is attributable to a state and constitutes a breach of an international obligation. ILC, supra note 9.
260. Cf. K. J. Partsch, Rassendiskriminierung. Die UN-Konvention und ihre Wirkungsweise (1971) 14.
261. Frowein, 'Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung', in Festschrift für Hermann Mosier (1983) 242, at 255
262. Koskenniemi, 'Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?', 72 BYbIL (2001) 337, at 347.
263. Cf. the references cited in B. Simma, Das Reziprozitätselement im Zustandekommen völkerrechtlicher Verträge (1972), at 176 et seq.
264. Riphagen, supra note 134, 17, para 89.
265. Ireland v. UK, European Court of Human Rights, Ser. A Vol. 25 para. 239.
266. In its decision in Chrysostomos and others, the European Commission spoke of a 'constitutional instrument', 34 Ybk European Commission on Human Rights (1991) 35, at 52 et seq.
267. Cf. generally, Simma, supra note 123
268. B. Simma, 'From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law', 250 RdC (1994, VI) 217, at 373.
269. Provided, of course, that the human rights treaty's rules on invocation of responsibility have been exhausted, cf. supra Sections 3C and 3D.
270. M. Virally, 'Le principe de réciprocité dans le droit international contemporain', 122 RdC (1967, III) 1, at 26. 'Every State Party to such a treaty has the right to require the other parties to respect these commitments, which have been made to the State itself.'
271. Frowein, supra note 209, at 256. Frowein's analysis is strongly influenced, however, by the conflicting interpretations of human rights by capitalist countries on the one hand and socialist countries on the other hand. His critique may be largely obsolete after the collapse of the East Bloc.
272. Koskenniemi, supra note 122, at 347. However, the focus of Koskenniemi's critique is the attempt to codify countermeasures in the collective interest, rather than the existence of such measures.
273. Cf. the discussion in Crawford, supra note 86, Add.4, 16 and 18, who concedes that there is 'a due process issue' from the perspective of the targeted state if a few powerful states decide to act as a kind of human rights police for the world, based on their auto-interpretation of human rights law
274. cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 131, at 347.
275. Cf. the cases compiled in the ILC commentary on Article 54, supra note 11, at 351 et seq.
276. and the cases compiled by K. Weschke, Internationale Instrumente zur Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte (2001), at 98 et seq.
277. Tomuschat, 'Are Counter-measures Subject to Prior Recourse to Dispute Settlement Procedures?', 5 EJIL (1994) 77, at 78.
278. Article 54 of the Draft Articles provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading, A/CNA/L.600.
279. Article 41 of the Draft Articles provisionally adopted in 2000 restricted countermeasures to wrongful acts 'that constitute a serious breach', meaning a 'gross and systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil its obligation, risking substantial harm to the fundamental interests protected thereby'. Draft Articles 51 to 53 spelled out limitations similar to 49 to 53 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 9.
280. Cf. Simma, 'Staatenverantwortlichkeit und Menschenrechte im ILC-Entwurf 2001', in J. A. Frowein, K. Scharioth, I. Winkelmann, R. Wolfrum (eds), Verhandeln für den Frieden - Negotiating for Peace, Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (2003) 423.
281. Reisman, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law', 84 AJIL (1990) 866, at 872.
282. Concurring, L. A. Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l'illicité (1990) 167;
283. Weschke, supra note 220.
284. McCaffrey, 'Lex Lata or the Continuum of State Responsibility', in J. H. H Weiler, A. Cassese and M. Spinedi (eds), International Crimes of State (1989) 244.
285. For instance, in the history of the European Convention, states have generally lodged inter-state complaints almost exclusively in situations where their interests were specially affected. The two exceptions were the application against Greece in 1967 (11 Yearbook European Commission on Human Rights (1968) 691; 12 (II) Yearbook European Commission on Human Rights (1969)), and the application against Turkey in 1982 (applications no. 9940-9940/82).
286. Cf. the title of a recent book by Ost and van de Kerchove, supra note 5. 'From the pyramid to the network'.
287. Craven, 'Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law', XIV Finnish Yearbook IL (2003) 3, at 12.
288. To play on a theme once developed by Weiler, supra note 178.