Firms' compliance to environmental regulation: Is there really a paradox?

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-18

  Nyborg, Karine ^a   Telle, Kjetil ^b  

^a RAGNAR FRISCH CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (Norway)

^b STATISTICS NORWAY   (Norway)

Author keywords

Compliance; Enforcement; Environmental performance; Harrington paradox

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

ENFORCEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE; HARRINGTON PARADOX; STANDARD THEORY;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; LAW ENFORCEMENT;

EURASIA; EUROPE; NORTHERN EUROPE; NORWAY; SCANDINAVIA;

EID: 33747623498     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9001-7     Document Type: Article

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