On the moral epistemology of ideal observer theories

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 359-374

  Kawall, Jason ^a  

^a Center for Language and Brain   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision procedure; Ethics; Ideal observer; Moral epistemology; Normative properties

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747472585     PISSN: 13862820     EISSN: 15728447     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9016-8     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Brandt, R.B., Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957.
2. Brandt, R.B., The Definition of an 'Ideal Observer' Theory in Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15(MR) (1955a), pp. 407-413.
3. Brandt, R.B., Some Comments on Professor Firth's Reply, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15(MR) (1955b), pp. 422-423.
4. Carson, T., The Status of Morality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984.
5. Carson, T., Value and the Good Life. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000.
6. Dancy, J., Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
7. Feldman, R., Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology, The Monist 68(JL) (1988), pp. 407-419.
8. Firth, R., Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12(MR) (1952), pp. 317-345.
9. Firth, R., Reply to Professor Brandt, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15(MR) (1955), pp. 414-421.
10. Friedman, M., What Are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
11. Goldman, A.H., Aesthetic Value. Boulder: Westview, 1995.
12. Goldman, A.I., The Internalist Conception of Justification, in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in Epistemology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, v. 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980, pp. 27-51.
13. Haraway, D., Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, essay 9 in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991.
14. Hare, R.M., Moral Thinking. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
15. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000.
16. Johnston, M., Dispositional Theories of Value, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63(Supp.) (1989), pp. 139-174.
17. Kawall, J., Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers, Philosophical Studies 109(3) (2002), pp. 197-222.
18. McDowell, J., Values and Secondary Qualities, in T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp. 110-129.
19. Montmarquet, J., Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993.
20. Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
21. Sayre-McCord, O., On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal - And Shouldn't Be, in E.F. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
22. Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
23. Sosa, E., Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue, Essay 13 in Knowledge in Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991a.
24. Sosa, E., Intellectual Virtue in Perspective, Essay 16 in Knowledge in Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991b.
25. Stark, C., Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality, Noûs 31(4) (1997), pp. 478-495.
26. Taliaferro, C., The Divine Command Theory of Ethics and the Ideal Observer, Sophia (Aust.) 22(JL) (1983), pp. 3-8.
27. Taliaferro, C., The Ideal Aesthetic Observer Revisited, British Journal of Aesthetics 30(1) (1990), pp. 1-13.
28. Taliaferro, C., Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
29. Vallentyne, P., Response-Dependence, Rigidification, and Objectivity, Erkenntnis 44(1) (1996), pp. 101-112.
30. Walker, M.U., Partial Consideration, Ethics 101(4) (1991), pp. 758-774.
31. Wiggins, D., A Sensible Subjectivism?, Essay V in Needs, Values, and Truth. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
32. Williamson, T., Knowledge and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
33. Zagzebski, L.T., Divine Motivation Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.