Response-dependence, rigidification and objectivity

Erkenntnis

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 101-112

  Vallentyne, Peter ^a  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747476249     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00172855     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Bealer, G.: 1982, Quality and Concept, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
2. Blackburn, S.: 1985, 'Errors and the Phenomenology of Value', in T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 1-22.
3. Boyd, R.: 1988, 'How to Be a Moral Realist', in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays in Moral Realism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 181-228.
4. Brink, D.: 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York.
5. Brower, B.: 1993, 'Dispositional Ethical Realism', Ethics 103, 221-49.
6. Campbell, J. and R. Pargetter: 1986, 'Goodness and Fragility', American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 155-65.
7. Dancy, J.: 1993, Moral Reasons, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
8. Goldman, A.: 1987, 'Red and Right', Journal of Philosophy 86, 349-62.
9. Haldane, J. and C. Wright (eds): 1993, Reality, Representation, and Projection, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
10. Jackson, F. and R. Pargetter: 1987, 'An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism About Colour', Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
11. Johnston, M.: 1989, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIII, 139-74.
12. Johnston, M.: 1992, 'How to Speak of the Colors', Philosophical Studies 68, 221-63.
13. Kaplan, D.: 1970, 'Dthat', in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 383-400.
14. Kripke, S.: 1971, 'Identity and Necessity', in M. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation, New York University Press, New York, pp. 135-64.
15. Lewis, D.: 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
16. Lewis, D.: 1989, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIII, 113-37.
17. McDowell, J.: 1985, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 110-29.
18. Pettit, P.: 1991, 'Realism and Response-Dependence', Mind C, 587-626.
19. Railton, P.: 1986, 'Moral Realism', The Philosophical Review XCV, 163-207.
20. Sayre-McCord, G.: 1994, 'On Why Hume's "General Point of View" Isn't Ideal - and Shouldn't Be', Social Philosophy and Policy 11, 202-228.
21. Shafer-Landau: 1994, 'Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism, and Moral Indeterminacy', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 331-44.
22. Smith, M.: 1987, 'Should We Believe in Emotivism?' in G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 289-310.
23. Smith, M.: 1989, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIII, 89-111.
24. Sturgeon, N.: 1984, 'Moral Explanations', in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason, and Truth, Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, New Jersey, pp. 49-78.
25. Wright, C.: 1988, 'Moral Values, Projections, and Secondary Qualities', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXII, 1-26.
26. Wright, C.: 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.