Self-serving punishment and the evolution of cooperation

Journal of Evolutionary Biology

Volumn 19, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 1383-1385

  Cant, M A ^a   Johnstone, R A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ANIMAL; ANIMAL BEHAVIOR; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; HUMAN; NOTE; PUNISHMENT;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; PUNISHMENT; SELECTION (GENETICS);

EID: 33747214597     PISSN: 1010061X     EISSN: 14209101     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01151.x     Document Type: Note

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