Leaving the prison: Permitting partner choice and refusal in prisoner's dilemma games

Computational Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 65-87

  Hauk, Esther ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Learning; Matching; Partner selection; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035435871     PISSN: 09277099     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013866527989     Document Type: Article

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