Strategic preemption in a common property resource: A continuous time approach

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 255-278

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Polasky, Stephen ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c University Fellow   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; INVENTORY CONTROL;

PROPERTY RESOURCES;

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT;

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; EXPLOITATION; HARVESTING; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 0036872579     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021288205689     Document Type: Article

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