The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

Politics and Policy

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 400-424

  Phythian, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WOLVERHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746551390     PISSN: 15555623     EISSN: 17471346     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00019.x     Document Type: Article

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