Possible worlds semantics and fiction

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 9-40

  Proudfoot, Diane ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Contradiction; Counterfactuals; Fiction; Impossible worlds; Incomplete narrative; Inconsistent narrative; Lewis; Modal fictionalism; Possible worlds; Truth in fiction

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746109945     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-005-9005-8     Document Type: Article

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