Responding to surprise

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 9, Issue , 2006, Pages 45-65

  Wirtz, James J ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Al Qaeda; Commissions; Intelligence; Pearl Harbor; September 11, 2001; Surprise attack; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745788194     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170600     Document Type: Review

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