Strategic surprise and the september 11 attacks

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 8, Issue , 2005, Pages 145-170

  Byman, Daniel ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Al Qaeda; Intelligence; Organization theory; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 22144467358     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104927     Document Type: Review

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