Ways Things Can’t Be

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 583-596

  Restall, Greg ^a  

^a MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52549104534     PISSN: 00294527     EISSN: 19390726     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540771     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Anderson, A. R., and N. D. Belnap, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975.
2. Dunn, J. M., “Intuitive semantics for first-degree entailments and’coupled trees’,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 29 (1976), p. 149-68.
3. Lewis, D., “Logic for equivocators,” Noûs, vol. 16 (1982), p. 431-41.
4. Lewis, D. K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.
5. Priest, G., “The logic of paradox,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 8 (1979), pp. 219-41.
6. Priest, G., “Minimally inconsistent LP,” Studia Logica, vol. 50 (1991), pp. 321-31.
7. Rescher, N., and R. Manor, “On inference from inconsistent premises,” Theory and Decision, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 179-217.
8. Restall, G., “Truthmakers, entailment and necessity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 74 (1996), pp. 331-40.
9. Stalnaker, R., Inquiry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984.