Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: Persistent divergence of party positions

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 547-569

  Owen, Guillermo ^a   Grofman, Bernard ^b  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745473113     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0087-1     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Adams J (1999) Multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting. Public Choice 99:259-274
2. Adams J, Merrill S, Groftnan B (2006) A unified theory of party competition: party strategies and policy representation in France, Britain, Norway and the United States. Cambridge University Press, New York
3. Aldrich JH (1983) A Downsian spatial model with party activism. Am Polit Sci Rev 77:974-990
4. Alesina A, Rosenthal H (1995) Partisan politics, divided government and the economy. Cambridge University Press, New York
5. Aranson P, Ordeshook PC (1972) Spatial strategy for sequential elections. In: Niemi RG, Weisberg H (eds) Probability models of collective decision making. Charles E. Merrill, Columbus, OH, pp 298-331
6. Baron DD (1994) Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters. Am Polit Sci Rev 88(1):33-47
7. Bernhardt MD, Ingberman DE (1985) Candidate reputations and the incumbency effect. J Public Econ 27:47-67
8. Black J (1978) The multicandidate calculus of voting: application to Canadian Federal Elections. Am J Polit Sci 22:609-638, August
9. Brams SJ (1978) Presidential election game. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT
10. Brams SJ (1980) Spatial models of election competition. University Modules in Applied Mathematics
11. Brams EJ, Merrill S (1991) Final-offer arbitration with a bonus. Eur J Polit Econ 7:79-82
12. Brennan G, Lomasky W (l 993) Democracy and decision: the pure theory of electoral preference. Cambridge University Press, New York
13. Budge T, David R, Derek H (eds) (1987) Ideology, strategy and party change: spatial analyses of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA
14. Bullock C, Brady DW (1983) Party, constituency, and roll-call voting in the U.S. Senate. Legis Stud Q 8:29-43
15. Cain B (1978) Strategic voting in Great Britain. Am J Polit Sci 22(3):639-655
16. Coleman JS (1971) Internal processes governing party positions in elections. Public Choice 11:35-60, Fall
17. Coleman .IS (1972) The positions of political parties in elections. In: Niemi RG, Weisberg F (eds) Probability models of collective decision making. Charles E. Merrill, Columbus, OH, pp 332-357
18. Cooper A, Munger MC (2000) The (un)predictability of presidential primaries with many candidates, Public Choice 103(3-4):337-355
19. Cox G (1997) Making votes count. Cambridge University Press, New York
20. Downs A (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper, New York
21. Duverger M (1958) Political parties, their organization and activity in the modern state (B. North and R. North, Trans.) Wiley, New York, Methuen, London
22. Enelow JM, Hinich MJ (1984) The spatial theory of political competition: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, New York
23. Enelow JM, Hinich MJ (1990) Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York
24. Fedderson TJ (1992) A voting model implying Duverger's law and positive turnout, Am J Polit Sci 36:938-962
25. Feld SL, Grofman B (1991) Incumbency advantage, voter loyalty and the benefit of the doubt. JTheor Polit 3(2):115-137
26. Fiorina M (1974) Representatives, roll calls and constituencies, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA
27. Glazer A ( 1993) Political equilibrium under group identification. In: Grofman B (ed) Information, participation and choice: an economic theory of democracy in perspective. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, pp 81-92
28. Glazer A, Grofman B, Owen G (1998) A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash, Public Choice 97:23-34
29. Grofman B (1985) Neglected role of the status quo in models of issue voting. J Polit 47:231-237
30. Grofman B (1993) Toward an institution-rich theory of political competition, with a supply-side component. In: Grofman B (ed) Information, participation and choice: 'an economic theory of democracy' in perspective. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, pp 179-193
31. Grofman B (1996) Downsian political economy. In: Goodin R, Klingemann, HD (eds) New handbook of political science. Oxford University Press, London
32. Grofman B (2004) Downs and two-party convergence. Annu Rev Pol Sci 7:25-46
33. Grofman B, Griffin R, Berry R (1995) House members who become senators: learning from a 'natural experiment' in representation. Legis Stud Q 20(4):513-529
34. Grofman B, Griffin R, Glazer A (1990) Identical geography, different constituencies, see what a difference party makes. In: Johnston RJ, Shelley F, Taylor P (eds) Developments in electoral geography. Croom Helm, London, pp 207-217
35. Groftnan B, Lijphart A (eds) (1986) Electoral laws and their political consequences. Agathon, New York
36. Lijphart A (1984) Democracies: patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries. Yale University Press, New Haven CT
37. Lijphart A (1992) Parliamentary vs. presidential government. Oxford University Press, New York
38. Lijphart A, Grofman B (eds) (1984) Choosing an electoral system. Praeger, New York
39. Macdonald SE, Listhaug O, Rabinowitz G (1991 ) Issues and party support in multiparty systems. Am Polit Sci Rev 85:1107-1131
40. McKelvey RD (1976) Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. J Econ Theory 12:472-482
41. Merrill S (1993) Voting behavior under the directional spatial model of electoral competition. Public Choice 77:739-756
42. Merrill S, Groftnan B (1997) Directional and proximity models of spatial two-party competition: a new synthesis. J Theor Polit 9(1):25-48
43. Merrill S, Grofman B (l 999) A unified theory of voter choice. Cambridge University Press, New York
44. Merrill S, Grofman B, Brunell T, Koetzle W (1999) The power of ideologically concentrated minorities. J Theor Polit 11(1):57-74
45. Miller N (1996) Majority rule and minority interests. In: Shapiro I, Hardin R (eds) Political order (Nomos XXXVTTT), New York University Press, New York, pp 207-250
46. Morton R (1993) Incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence. Am Polit Sci Rev 87(2):382-392
47. Palfrey T, Erikson R (1994) Preemptive spending and entry deterrence by incumbents in congressional elections. Social science working Paper. California Institute of Technology, March
48. Poole KT, Rosenthal H (1984) The polarization of American politics, J Polit 46:1061-1079
49. Rabinowitz G, Macdonald SE (1989) A directional theory of issue voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 83:93-121
50. Riker WH (1982) The two-party system and Duverger's Law: an essay on the history of political science. Am Polit Sci Rev 6(4):753-768
51. Robertson D ( 1987) Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1946-1981 : an initial comparative analysis, In: Budge T, Robertson D, Hearl D (eds) Ideology, strategy and party change: spatial analysis of post-war elections programmes in nineteen democracies. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 39-72
52. Schofield N (1996) The heart of a polity, In: Schofield N (ed) Collective decision-making: social choice and political economy. Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston, pp 183-220
53. Shapiro CR, Brady DW, Brody JA, Brody RA, Ferejohn JA (1990) Linking constituency opinion and senate voting scores: a hybrid explanation. Legis Stud Q 15(4):599-623
54. Shepsle K (1979) Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. Am J Polit Sci 23:27-59
55. Shepsle KA, Weingast BR (1984) Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions, Am J Polit Sci 28(1):49-74
56. Wittman D (1973) Parties as utility maximizers. Am Polit Sci Rev 18:490-498
57. Wittman D (1977) Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model. J Econ Theory 14: 180-189
58. Wittman D (1983) Candidate motivation: a synthesis of alternative theories. Am Polit Sci Rev72:78-90