International Equity and Climate Change Policy

Climate ChangeEconomics and Policy: An RFF Anthology

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 235-247

  Cazorla, Marina V ^a   Toman, Michael A ^b  

^a California Coastal Commission   (United States)

^b RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85189799993     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781936331437-27     Document Type: Chapter

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