Deregulating network industries: Dealing with price-quality tradeoffs

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 99-115

  Buehler, Stefan ^a,b   Gärtner, Dennis ^a,b   Halbheer, Daniel ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Access charges; Deregulation; Infrastructure quality; Investment incentives; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744786834     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-0011-8     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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