Wealth constraints and option contracts in models with sequential investments

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 753-770

  Lülfesmann, Christoph ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744721359     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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