Expropriation vs. proportional sharing in corporate acquisitions

Journal of Business

Volumn 79, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 1413-1444

  Faccio, Mara ^a   Stolin, David ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TOULOUSE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646888664     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/500680     Document Type: Review

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