Asset specificity and the fear of exploitation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 423-438

  Hwang, Peter ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Asset specificity; Fear of exploitation; Time horizon; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646787838     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.04.007     Document Type: Article

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