Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-6

  Berger, Ulrich ^a   Hofbauer, Josef ^b  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

BNN dynamics; Dominated strategies; Nash map

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646767816     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.006     Document Type: Article

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