Does the representation of household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies? An introduction

Review of Economics of the Household

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 99-111

  Bargain, Olivier ^a,b   Beblo, Miriam ^c   Beninger, Denis ^c   Blundell, Richard ^d,e   Carrasco, Raquel ^f   Chiuri, Maria Concetta ^b,g   Laisney, François ^c,h   Lechene, Valérie ^d,i   Moreau, Nicolas ^j   Myck, Michal ^d,k   Ruiz Castillo, Javier ^f   Vermeulen, Frederic ^l  

^a IZA   (Germany)

^b CHILD   (Italy)

^c CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

^d INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES   (United Kingdom)

^e UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^f UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^g UNIVERSITY OF BARI   (Italy)

^h UNIVERSITÉ LOUIS PASTEUR   (France)

ⁱ WADHAM COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^j TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^k DIW BERLIN   (Germany)

^l TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

more..

Author keywords

Collective model; Household labor supply; Intra household allocations; Tax reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646540152     PISSN: 15695239     EISSN: 15737152     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11150-006-0001-8     Document Type: Editorial

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