Individual decisions and household demand for consumption and leisure

Research in Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 277-324

  Chiuri, Maria Concetta ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Consumption; D1; D7; Intra household allocation; Labour supply

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042912138     PISSN: 10909443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/reec.2000.0230     Document Type: Article

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