Assessing the market power due to the network constraints in competitive electricity markets

Electric Power Systems Research

Volumn 76, Issue 11, 2006, Pages 953-961

  Bompard, E ^a   Ma, Y C ^a   Napoli, R ^a   Jiang, C W ^b  

^a POLITECNICO DI TORINO   (Italy)

^b SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Congestion; Market power; Nash equilibrium; Supply function equilibrium

Indexed keywords

CONSTRAINT THEORY; ELECTRIC GENERATORS; ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION; ELECTRICITY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

CONGESTION; MARKET POWER; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM;

ELECTRIC UTILITIES;

EID: 33646528917     PISSN: 03787796     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2005.12.004     Document Type: Article

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