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Volumn 312, Issue 5774, 2006, Pages 689-

Debating sexual selection and mating strategies [1]

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANIMAL COMMUNICATION; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; CONCEPT ANALYSIS; COOPERATION; COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; GAME; HUMAN; LETTER; MATING; NASH COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM; NONHUMAN; ORGANISMAL INTERACTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR; SEXUAL SELECTION;

EID: 33646453976     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Letter
Times cited : (14)

References (9)
  • 2
    • 0001885866 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • L. A. Dugatkin, H. K. Reeve, Eds. (Oxford Univ. Press, New York)
    • P. Hammerstein, in Game Theory and Animal Behavior, L. A. Dugatkin, H. K. Reeve, Eds. (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1998), pp. 3-15.
    • (1998) Game Theory and Animal Behavior , pp. 3-15
    • Hammerstein, P.1
  • 4
    • 33646451887 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • At evolutionary stability, negotiation rules are the best responses to each other, but this does not mean that the actions that result from using such a pair of negotiation rules are the best responses to each other. Roughgarden et al. are correct to emphasize that the process-by which actions are chosen is important to the outcome (choice of action), but this point has been made before (6, 7). Furthermore, under some modeling assumptions, the outcomes are more cooperative than with no interaction, while with other assumptions they are less cooperative (7-9).
  • 5
    • 33646465086 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • For a detailed discussion of the points raised in this letter, see www.sciencemag.org/cgi/eletters/311/5763/965.


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.