Honours: A neglected incentive;Auszeichnungen: Ein vernachlässigter Anreiz

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 271-284

  Frey, Bruno S ^a   Neckermann, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; MODELING; TAX INCENTIVE; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 33646110258     PISSN: 14656493     EISSN: 14682516     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-6493.2006.00209.x     Document Type: Article

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