Does profit sharing reduce conflict with the boss? Evidence from Germany

International Economic Journal

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 235-250

  Heywood, John S ^a   Jirjahn, Uwe ^b   Tsertsvadze, Georgi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

^b LEIBNIZ UNIVERSITY HANNOVER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Health; Mutual monitoring; Profit sharing; Supervisor

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646003477     PISSN: 10168737     EISSN: 1743517X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10168730500080741     Document Type: Article

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