Corruption and conservation: The need for empirical analyses. A response to Smith & Walpole

ORYX

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 257-259

  Ferraro, Paul ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSERVATION; CORRUPTION; ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 33646000256     PISSN: 00306053     EISSN: 13653008     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S003060530500075X     Document Type: Short Survey

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