Monetary - Fiscal interactions with a conservative central bank

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 90-128

  Lambertini, Luisa ^a,b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; FISCAL POLICY; INFLATION; MACROECONOMICS; MONETARY POLICY;

EID: 33645979002     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2006.00372.x     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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