Ownership structure of publicly traded newspaper companies and their financial performance

Journal of Media Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 119-136

  An, Soontae ^a   Hyun, Seung Jin ^a   Simon, Todd ^a  

^a KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645969301     PISSN: 08997764     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1207/s15327736me1902_3     Document Type: Article

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