Allocating the added value of energy policies

Energy Journal

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 143-156

  Murphy, Frederic H ^a   Rosenthal, Edward C ^a  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENERGY POLICY; ESTIMATION; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODEL; POLICY CONTRIBUTION;

ENERGY MANAGEMENT;

EID: 33645748697     PISSN: 01956574     EISSN: None     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No2-8     Document Type: Article

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