Shapley value predicts the distribution of eu expenditure among member states

Journal of European Integration

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 165-198

  Soukeník, Karel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Budgetary bargaining; European Union; Game theory; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645747853     PISSN: 07036337     EISSN: 14772280     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07036330108429100     Document Type: Article

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