Capital structure, compensation and incentives

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 605-632

  Douglas, Alan V S ^a,b  

^a School of Accountancy   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645735771     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhj010     Document Type: Article

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