International cooperation, coalitions stability and free riding in a game of pollution control

Manchester School

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 103-122

  Breton, Michèle ^a   Fredj, Karima ^b   Zaccour, Georges ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645113581     PISSN: 14636786     EISSN: 14679957     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00485.x     Document Type: Article

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