Chapter 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 2229-2269

  Benoît, Jean Pierre ^a   Kornhauser, Lewis A ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

accidents; Coase Theorem; economic analysis of law; positive political theory; voting power

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645036610     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03023-0     Document Type: Review

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