Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence

Economic Theory

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 435-453

  Lebrun, Bernard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

First price auctions; Nash equilibrium correspondence; Robustness of numerical and theoretical results

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036026166     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990100227     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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