Model uncertainty, optimal monetary policy and the preferences of the fed

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 105-126

  Castelnuovo, Efrem ^a   Surico, Paolo ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; FINANCIAL MARKET; INTEREST RATE; MONETARY POLICY;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 1142306010     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0036-9292.2004.05101007.x     Document Type: Article

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