On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 941-946

  Chevaleyre, Yann ^a   Endriss, Ulle ^b   Maudet, Nicolas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

^b IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK; OPTIMAL ALLOCATION; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; OPTIMIZATION;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 33144460972     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

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