Reconsidering the effectiveness of international economic sanctions: An examination of selection bias

International Politics

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 133-149

  Blake, Charles H ^a   Klemm, Noah ^b  

^a JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic sanctions; Methodology; Selection bias

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; METHODOLOGY; POLITICAL CONFLICT; SANCTION;

EID: 32844454378     PISSN: 13845748     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800137     Document Type: Article

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