A characterization of the existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 205-218

  Liu, Liqun ^a   Tian, Guoqiang ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dominant strategy implementation; Groves mechanisms

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242774678     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050034     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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