Board structure and fee-setting in the U.S. mutual fund industry

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 321-355

  Tufano, Peter ^a   Sevick, Matthew ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b Monitor United States   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Governance; Mutual funds

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031537006     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00033-0     Document Type: Article

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