Exponential communication inefficiency of demand queries

Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on the Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 158-164

  Nisan, Noam ^a   Segal, Ilya ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; PROBABILITY;

COMBINATORIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS; DEMAND QUERIES;

INFORMATION ANALYSIS;

EID: 32144439548     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

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