Informational size and efficient auctions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 809-827

  McClean, Richard ^a   Postlewaite, Andrew ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION; MODELING;

EID: 3843080884     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00305.x     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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