Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 175-188

  Dekel, Eddie ^a,b   Wolinsky, Asher ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Common knowledge of rationality; Large auctions; Rationalizability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038730502     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00016-2     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Chung, K.S., Ely, J., 2000. Efficient and dominance solvable auctions with interdependent valuations. WP 1313, CMSEMS, Northwestern University.
4. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
5. Guesnerie, R., 1992. An exploration of the eductive justifications of the rational-expectations hypothesis. Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (5), 1254-1278.
6. Myerson, R., 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
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8. van Damme, E., 1987. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibrium. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY.