Using utility theory to optimize a salary incentive plan for grant-funded faculty

Academic Medicine

Volumn 79, Issue 7, 2004, Pages 652-660

  Joiner, Keith A ^a,b,c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA COLLEGE OF MEDICINE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ATTITUDE; COST; COST UTILITY ANALYSIS; MEDICAL EDUCATION; MEDICAL SCHOOL; MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SALARY; UNITED STATES; UNIVERSITY;

EID: 3042817431     PISSN: 10402446     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/00001888-200407000-00008     Document Type: Article

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