Performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 93-118

  Golec, Joseph ^a   Starks, Laura ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Mutual funds; Performance fees; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042547948     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.05.001     Document Type: Article

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