Transfer pricing and hold-ups in supply chains

German Economic Review

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 211-230

  Böckem, Sabine ^a   Schiller, Ulf ^b  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Hold up problem; Incomplete contracts; Renegotiation; Supply chain

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT; INFORMATION SYSTEM; PRICE DYNAMICS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 3042542943     PISSN: 14656485     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-6485.2004.00104.x     Document Type: Article

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