Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 95-114

  Engle Warnick, Jim ^a   Slonim, Robert L ^b  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Incomplete contracts; Repeated games; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 29944444187     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.009     Document Type: Article

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