Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-30

  Blechman, Barry M ^a,b   Wittes, Tamara Cofman ^c  

^a DFI International   (United States)

^b Henry L Stimson Center   (United States)

^c GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347093240     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2657989     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984, published as Department of Defense News Release No. 609-84.
2. Interview by Barry Blechman with General Colin Powell, 21 February 1997.
3. Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992; and Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Force: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs 72 (Winter 1992-1993): 32-45.
4. Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992; and Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Force: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs 72 (Winter 1992-1993): 32-45.
5. George Shultz, "The Ethics of Power" (address given at the convocation of Yeshiva University, New York City, 9 December 1985), Department of State Bulletin, 1-3 February 1985.
6. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, 21 September 1992).
7. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
8. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
9. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
10. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
11. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
12. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
13. Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).
14. Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
15. Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
16. Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
17. Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
18. Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
19. Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
20. This term was first suggested by Alexander George. See his discussion of credibility and of the magnitude of demands in George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.
21. See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 1978); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Some scholars argue that forceful precedents are useful only when they reflect core U.S. interests; for example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
22. See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 1978); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Some scholars argue that forceful precedents are useful only when they reflect core U.S. interests; for example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
23. See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 1978); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Some scholars argue that forceful precedents are useful only when they reflect core U.S. interests; for example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
24. See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 1978); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Some scholars argue that forceful precedents are useful only when they reflect core U.S. interests; for example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
25. For discussion of the role that public opinion plays in America's ability to take effective military action abroad, see Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How"; and J. Holl, "We the People Here Don't Want No War" in Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force.
26. For discussion of the role that public opinion plays in America's ability to take effective military action abroad, see Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How"; and J. Holl, "We the People Here Don't Want No War" in Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force.
27. Interview by Barry Blechman with Richard Cheney, 15 January 1997. See also Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?" International Security 17 (Fall 1992): 2; and George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.
28. Interview by Barry Blechman with Richard Cheney, 15 January 1997. See also Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?" International Security 17 (Fall 1992): 2; and George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.
29. George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.
30. See R. L. Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process, RAND Note N-3265-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991); Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega (New York: Putnam, 1990); and J. B. Treaster, "Noriega Military Command Belittles General," New York Times, 27 December 1989.
31. See R. L. Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process, RAND Note N-3265-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991); Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega (New York: Putnam, 1990); and J. B. Treaster, "Noriega Military Command Belittles General," New York Times, 27 December 1989.
32. See R. L. Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process, RAND Note N-3265-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991); Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega (New York: Putnam, 1990); and J. B. Treaster, "Noriega Military Command Belittles General," New York Times, 27 December 1989.
33. Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War.
34. Paul G. Lauren, "Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in History" in Alexander L. George and Willaim E. Simons, eds., Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, suggests that ultimatums are the most explicit and precise method of communicating demands and that they may lessen the chances of misperception or miscalculation by the opponent.
35. Lawrence L. Whetten, The Canal War: Four Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974).
36. On the effect that degree of difficulty and losing face have on the effectiveness of threats, see George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.
37. Sources used for this case study include contemporaneous news reports; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process; Woodward, The Commanders; and Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator.
38. Sources used for this case study include contemporaneous news reports; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process; Woodward, The Commanders; and Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator.
39. Sources used for this case study include contemporaneous news reports; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process; Woodward, The Commanders; and Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator.
40. Sources used for this case study include contemporaneous news reports; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process; Woodward, The Commanders; and Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator.
41. Sources used for this case study include contemporaneous news reports; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Grant, Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process; Woodward, The Commanders; and Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator.
42. President Bush even stated in a news conference on 13 October 1989 that using force in Panama was "a stupid argument that some very erudite people make." (Transcript printed in New York Times, 14 October 1989).
43. Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
44. Interview by Barry Blechman with General Colin Powell, 21 February 1997.
45. Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992): Baker and Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Woodward, The Commanders; and Powell with Persico, My American Journey. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.
46. Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992): Baker and Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Woodward, The Commanders; and Powell with Persico, My American Journey. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.
47. Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992): Baker and Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Woodward, The Commanders; and Powell with Persico, My American Journey. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.
48. Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992): Baker and Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Woodward, The Commanders; and Powell with Persico, My American Journey. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.
49. Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992): Baker and Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Woodward, The Commanders; and Powell with Persico, My American Journey. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.
50. Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992): Baker and Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Woodward, The Commanders; and Powell with Persico, My American Journey. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.
51. Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis.
52. Interview by Barry Blechman with Richard Cheney, 15 January 1997.
53. There have been some suggestions, however, that the United States made such a threat to deter the Iraqis from using chemical weapons. See James Baker's comments on his Geneva meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1991, in The Gulf War, a BBC/WGBH Frontline coproduction, written and produced by Eamonn Matthews (Seattle: PBS Video, 1996).
54. Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf," 2.
55. See postscript for information on later developments.
56. Primary sources for this case study include FBIS transcripts of Radio Mogadishu broadcasts; contemporaneous news reports; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; and Barry M. Blechman and J. M. Vaccaro, Towards an Operational Strategy of Peace Enforcement: Lessons from Interventions and Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Defense Forecasts International, 1995).
57. Primary sources for this case study include FBIS transcripts of Radio Mogadishu broadcasts; contemporaneous news reports; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; and Barry M. Blechman and J. M. Vaccaro, Towards an Operational Strategy of Peace Enforcement: Lessons from Interventions and Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Defense Forecasts International, 1995).
58. Primary sources for this case study include FBIS transcripts of Radio Mogadishu broadcasts; contemporaneous news reports; Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Powell with Persico, My American Journey; and Barry M. Blechman and J. M. Vaccaro, Towards an Operational Strategy of Peace Enforcement: Lessons from Interventions and Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Defense Forecasts International, 1995).
59. Interview by Barry Blechman with William Perry, 21 January 1997.
60. Sources for this case study included Powell with Persico, My American Journey; contemporaneous U.S. news reports; and FBIS transcripts of Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole.
61. D. Ribadeneira, "Life as Usual for Haiti Troops: At Military Headquarters in Capital, No Signs of Concern," Boston Globe, 15 May 1994; A. Downie, "U.S. Diplomats in Haiti Threatened, Ship Delayed," Reuters, 11 October 1993; A. Downie, "Tense Standoff in Haiti over U.S. Troopship," Reuters North American Wire, 12 October 1993.
62. D. Ribadeneira, "Life as Usual for Haiti Troops: At Military Headquarters in Capital, No Signs of Concern," Boston Globe, 15 May 1994; A. Downie, "U.S. Diplomats in Haiti Threatened, Ship Delayed," Reuters, 11 October 1993; A. Downie, "Tense Standoff in Haiti over U.S. Troopship," Reuters North American Wire, 12 October 1993.
63. D. Ribadeneira, "Life as Usual for Haiti Troops: At Military Headquarters in Capital, No Signs of Concern," Boston Globe, 15 May 1994; A. Downie, "U.S. Diplomats in Haiti Threatened, Ship Delayed," Reuters, 11 October 1993; A. Downie, "Tense Standoff in Haiti over U.S. Troopship," Reuters North American Wire, 12 October 1993.
64. According to a wire service report, Downie, "U.S. Diplomats in Haiti Threatened," Haitian paramilitaries demonstrating in Port-au-Prince chanted, "We're going to make a second Somalia here!" and UN envoy Dante Caputo said that the Haitians were "trying to create an atmosphere where it would be a disaster, a blood bath, if foreign troops came."
65. Sources for this case study include North Korea, The Public Perspective 5 (July/August, 1994): 5; statements by President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, and other U.S. officials; and contemporaneous news reports.
66. Interview by Barry Blechman with Walter Slocombe, 27 January 1996.
67. Sources for this case study include public statements by President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Perry; transcripts of State Department press conferences; and Chinese Foreign Ministry statements, including press conferences by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.
68. Burns, "Fallout from Taiwan Tensions: U.S. Cancels China Talks," The Record, 23 March 1996.