Approximating revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2005, Pages 267-273

  Likhodedov, Anton ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Computer Science Department ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; OPTIMAL AUCTION; PARAMETER SPACE; VIRTUAL VALUATIONS;

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; OPTIMIZATION; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; VIRTUAL REALITY;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS;

EID: 29344451250     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

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