Security of two quantum cryptography protocols using the same four qubit states

Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2005, Pages

  Branciard, Cyril ^a,b   Gisin, Nicolas ^a   Kraus, Barbara ^a   Scarani, Valerio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^b TELECOM PARISTECH   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ATTENUATED LASER; QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOLS; SINGLE-PHOTON SOURCE;

ERROR ANALYSIS; INFORMATION THEORY; LASER PULSES; NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 28844482905     PISSN: 10502947     EISSN: 10941622     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.72.032301     Document Type: Article

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