Coherent-pulse implementations of quantum cryptography protocols resistant to photon-number-splitting attacks

Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 123091-1230916

  Acín, Antonio ^a   Gisin, Nicolas ^a   Scarani, Valerio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AMPLIFICATION; ATTENUATION; ELEMENTARY PARTICLES; INTEGRAL EQUATIONS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTICAL FIBERS; PERTURBATION TECHNIQUES; POISSON EQUATION; QUANTUM THEORY;

QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTIONS (QKD); QUANTUM STATES;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 4544222212     PISSN: 10502947     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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38. b does not provide any advantage to the honest parties when they use this alternative encoding.